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BUTLER v. McKELLAR
110 S. Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In August of 1980, Horace Butler was arrested on an assault and
battery charge in Charleston County, South Carolina. Upon his arrest,
Butler invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. Although Coun-
sel was appointed and represented Butler at a pre-trial hearing, he was
unable to post the required bond and, therefore, remained in jail. On
September 1, 1980, Butler was informed that, in addition to the assault
and battery charge, he was suspected of the unrelated murder of
Pamela Lane.
After informing Butler of their suspicions, the police initiated a
new interrogation pertaining to the murder. Butler eventually con-
fessed to the murder of Pamela Lane. Based upon his confession,
Butler was found guilty of committing murder in the commission of
a rape and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina affirmed Butler's conviction on direct appeal. State v. But-
ler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982). The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
In collateral proceedings, Butler relied primarily on Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), a case decided before his direct appeal
had ended with denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court.
In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement offi-
cials are prohibited from further questioning a defendant held in
continuous custody, once that defendant invokes his right to counsel.
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1215. Butler's Edwards claim was unsuccessful
in both state and federal habeas actions and the Supreme Court later
noted that his confession "was conducted in strict accordance with
established law at the time." Id. at 1216.
One month after the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
Butler's federal habeas petition, the United States Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). In
Roberson, the Supreme Court reviewed a claim identical to Butler's
and expressly denied Arizona's request to make an exception to
Edwards. Arizona sought an exception which would have allowed the
police to conduct a new interrogation on unrelated charges. The Court
ruled that once a suspectheld in continuous custody requests counsel,
the fifth amendment bars police initiated interrogation of the accused
involving any matter. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 688.
The Fourth Circuit initially denied Butler's claim on the merits.
In light of Roberson, a Fourth Circuit panel reconsidered Butler's
claims. However, the court refused to give Butler'the retroactive
benefit of Roberson because it found that the Edwards-Roberson
limitations are only tangentially related to the truth finding function.
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216.
HOLDING
After granting Butler's petition for certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court in a five to four decision (Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy), affirmed
the Fourth Circuit's denial of relief and held that Roberson stated a
"new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and that
consequently Butler was not entitled to the benefit of a retroactive
application of the decision in Roberson. Further, the Court held that
Roberson did not fit within one of the two exceptions to the Teague
doctrine. (See case summaries of Saffle v. Parks and Sawyer v. Smith,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.)
The Courtdenied Butler federal habeas relief based uponRoberson
because it found that the result in Roberson was not definitely dictated
by precedent existing at the time Butler's conviction became final.
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In Butler, the Supreme Court has virtually completed the de-
struction offederal habeas review which itbegan in Teague. In Teague,
the Court denied the petitioner relief and adopted a version of Justice
Harlan's theory of retroactivity, holding that "a case announces a new
rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government, . . . tor] if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final." Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 (emphasis in original). The Court's
policy in Teague is that in most cases the state's interest of leaving
convictions in a state of repose outweighs the individual's interest in
re-adjudicating his case based upon new legal rules created after the
time at which his conviction became final. Id. at 1072. The purpose of
the "new rule" doctrine is to allow state courts to issue their decisions
based upon a faithful application of well established constitutional
standards existing at the time the case is heard, even though later
decisions may modify those standards. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
However, the Butler Court did not apply the tests established in
Teague. Instead, the Court held that a "new rule" will be found to exist
whenever the issue of whether a holding is dictated by precedent is
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds".Id. Although the Court
outlined two exceptions under which a "new rule" may apply retro-
actively, these exceptions are quite narrow and rarely occur.
The first exception allowing retroactive application of a "new
rule" occurs when, either a specific form of conduct is placed "beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" or, as
extended in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989), when the
imposition of a particular form of punishment is prohibited on a
certain class of individuals. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218 (citing, Teague,
109 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Mackey v. UnitedStates, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.))). The second exception to the
rule limits the scope of retroactive application by limiting it to "those
new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion is seriously diminished." Id. (citing Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076.)
(See case summaries of Saffle v. Parks and Sawyer v. Smith, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.)
It appears evident that Butler should have been granted habeas
relief based upon Edwards v. Arizona, supra. In Edwards, the Court
reviewed the defendant's petition for habeas relief based upon the fact
that the police renewed their interrogation of Edwards after he
asserted his right to obtain counsel during a previous interrogation
regarding the same alleged crimes. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219. Upon
review, the Court established the rule that "a suspect who has 'ex,
pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication ... with the police."' Id. at 1220 (quoting
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).
Later, in Arizona v. Roberson, the Supreme Court applied its
holding in Edwards to cases in which the police wished to continue
interrogation of the defendant based upon different charges. Id. As
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Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Butler, "It is clear from our
opinion in Roberson that we would have reached the identical conclu-
sion had that case reached us in 1983 when Butler's conviction
became final." Id. It is clear that the decision in Roberson was dictated
by Edwards, that Roberson did not establish a "new rule," and that
Butler should have been granted habeas relief. The Court's new
standard, however, apparently established that a result is not "dictated"
if one judge could erroneously but not unreasonably conclude oth-
erwise.
Justice Brennan's dissent,joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, characterized the majority holding as now requiring a
defendant seeking habeas relief to show "that the state court's rejection
of the constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-
prevailing legal standards that the decision could not be defended by
any reasonable jurist." Id. at 1219 (emphasis in original). Brennan
also pointed out that the majority's broad definition of what consti-
tutes a "new rule," coupled with their narrow definition of what
constitutes prior precedent "limits [a] federal court's habeas corpus
function to reviewing state courts' legal analysis under the equivalent
of a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review." Id. at 1221-22.
The Butler opinion clearly effects Virginia defense counsel by
decreasing the effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Butler's only
possible benefit to the defense community is to foster an increased
sense of responsibility and professionalism on the part of trial judges
and attorneys because, as of now, an entire layer of appellate review
has been virtually eliminated.
Summary and analysis by:
Thomas J. Marlowe
SAFFLE v. PARKS
110 S. Ct. 1257,108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Robyn Leroy Parks shot and killed Abdullah Ibrahim at an
Oklahoma City gas station where Ibrahim worked. The victim died of a
single chest wound. Parks told a friend that he shot Ibrahim because he
feared Ibrahim would tell the police that Parks purchased gasoline with
a stolen credit card.
The jury found Parks guilty of capital murder. During his penalty
trial, Parks offered evidence of his background and character in an effort
to show that his youth, race, school experience and broken home were
mitigating factors. The trial judge instructed the jury that it must
consider all mitigating circumstances proffered by Parks and that it
could consider any additional mitigating circumstances found from the
evidence. The judge specifically warned the jury, however, to avoid any
influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
factor when imposing sentence.
After deliberation, the jury found that Parks committed the murder
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution
and sentenced him to death. Parks exhausted his direct appeal and state
collateral proceedings. He then sought federal habeas relief claiming,
inter alia, that the trial judge's antisympathy instruction violated the
eighth amendment because it effectively told the jury to disregard the
type of mitigating evidence Parks presented. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied relief. On rehearing,
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the antisympathy instruction
was unconstitutional for the reasons advanced by Parks. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that Parks was not entitled to federal
habeas relief because he was requesting the court to apply a "new rule"
of constitutional law. (See case summary of Butler v. McKellar, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue, which discusses the stark realities of the
Supreme Court's "new rule" doctrineingreater detail.) InTeaguev. Lane,
109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the Court held that a new rule of constitutional
law will not be applied retroactively in cases on collateral review unless
the rule comes within one of two narrow exceptions. Id. at 1075. A new
rule was defined as a rule that "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government" or one that "was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became fimal."Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original). The Court held that the
relief Parks sought would indeed constitute a new rule under Teague
because at the time the state court was considering Parks' claim, that
court was not compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the
antisympathy instructionviolated the eighth amendment. Saffle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990).
Additionally, the Court held that the new rule did not fall within
either of the two exceptions set forth in Teague. The first exception
allows the retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review if the
new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."'
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 692 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.)).
In Penry v,. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), the Court examined
this exception in greater detail in response to Penry's claim that the
eighth amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded indi-
viduals. The Court stated, "[i]fwe were to hold thatthe eighth amendment
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry, we
would be announcing a 'new rule."' Id. at 2952. The Court went on to
say, however, that such a new rule would meet the first Teague exception
because, "a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the
State's power to punish by-eath is analogous to a new rule placing
certain conduct beyond the State's power to punish at all." Id. Conse-
quently, Penry expanded the first exception to include retroactive ap-
plication of a new rule when the rule prohibits "a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."
Id.
The Parks court found that a new rule which held that an
antisympathy instruction violated the eighth amendment would not fall
within the first exception as developedby Teague andPenry. Parks, 110
S.Ct. at 1264. Further, after examining the second Teague exception,
(which is discussed in more detail in the case summary of Sawyer v.
Smith, Capital Defense Digest, this issue) the Court found that the
potential unconstitutionality of an antisympathy instruction did not fall
into the category of "'watershedrules ofcriminalprocedure' implicating
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Id.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Years ago, the decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), established that a State
